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Abstract 
The privatisation of urban water supply services is a highly contentious issue 
as evidenced by public protests against large water companies such as 
International Water Ltd in Cochabamba and Manila. Arguably, privatisation 
precipitates the transformation of previously unowned or commonly-owned 
resources into private ownership and control to the detriment of communities. 
In this regard, water has become an important resource over which national 
and global neoliberal policies are tested and has affected how people relate to 
and are able to access water, with the poor and other marginal groups likely 
to be disadvantage.  
In this paper, I draw on research from Tagbilaran, the Philippines, where the 
majority of the city’s water needs are provided by a private water utility to 
explore the ways in which politics, water resources and water provision are 
intimately linked. In particular, I focus on how the actions of local political 
leaders serve to obscure challenges to water management and security by 
instead focusing the public’s attention on a privatisation debate largely 
demarcated along party lines. 
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Introduction 
Since December 2000, Bohol Water Utilities Inc. (BWUI), a public/private joint 
venture company, has been sharing responsibility for providing potable water to 
households in Tagbilaran City, the Philippines. Residents of Tagbilaran are also 
served by a second water utility owned and operated by the City Government, 
Tagbilaran City Waterworks Services (TCWS). Between these two utilities, water 
services coverage extends to approximately 80 per cent of the more than 15 500 
city households. The remaining households rely on bulk-water, private or communal 
wells, other small-scale vendors, or rainwater, or a combination of these sources to 
meet their daily water needs. BWUI assumed responsibility for water provision after 
the partial divestiture of the Provincial Waterworks System (PWS), which was owned 
and operated by the Provincial Government of Bohol. The Provincial Government 
retains a 30 per cent holding in the joint venture, with the remaining 70 per cent 
held by a Singaporean/Filipino consortium, Salcon. In 2004, there were 
approximately 9700 consumers served by BWUI while the city’s water utility, TCWS, 
served approximately 3500 consumers. 
As the Provincial capital of Bohol, Tagbilaran has experienced rapid population 
growth primarily because of its role as a stepping stone to larger cities in the 
Philippines. As a result of this growth, the water utilities have been faced with 
increasing difficulties in ensuring universal water supply that is reliable and of an 
acceptable quality. Demand is forecast to increase while supplies are already 
threatened due to over-extraction and potential for contamination. In response, the 
Provincial Government invited the private sector to participate in the provision of 
water to households in Tagbilaran, leading to vociferous objections from factions 
within the political community and surprising reactions from the general public. 
In this paper, I explore the ways in which politics, water resources and water 
provision are intimately linked by looking at the key issues surrounding the 
privatisation and operation of BWUI. In particular, I focus on politics at the micro-
scale to demonstrate how political leaders in Tagbilaran mobilise public opinion 
against BWUI as a means by which to gain popular support, especially in the lead up 
to the 2004 and 2007 government elections. Rather than taking a simple pro- or 
anti-privatisation stance, in this paper I offer a nuanced view of privatisation and the 
politics of privatisation in my examination of Tagbilaran City. I will show that the 
polemical debate surrounding the privatisation in Tagbilaran, which is fuelled by 
hyperbole and misinformation, is a ‘red herring’ obscuring the complexities of water 
services provision. 
Following the introduction, which outlines the research area and case study 
background, the paper is organised into four sections. The first section reveals the 
dominance of neoliberal discourse in development and arguments citing public 
sector failure as being the key factors facilitating private sector participation in urban 
water provision. The review extends to consider how urban political ecology can be 
usefully deployed in order to expose and understand the significance of the socio-
political relations over water and the urbanisation of water for municipal supply. In 
the second section, I elucidate the key reasons given by the Provincial Government 
of Bohol regarding their decision to divest the urban water utility thereby enabling 
the private sector to participate in urban water provision in Tagbilaran. I then 
present a synopsis of urban water services in Tagbilaran and an overview of the 
privatisation process. In the third section I highlight some of the controversies that 
arose during the negotiation and bidding process leading up to the divestiture, as 
well as controversies following the divestiture and commencement of operations by 
BWUI in 2000. Particular attention is given to the role of political leaders and the 
way in which the ‘privatisation issue’ features as a key issue during election 
campaigns. The final section presents a summary and conclusions. 
The paper draws on findings from research conducted in Tagbilaran between 
June 2003 and October 2004 as well as reports made in the local newspapers, 
especially the Bohol Chronicle, which I continue to monitor. Although I am 
somewhat sceptical about what is being presented in the newspapers and how, this 
source provides an account of events and a timeline which is useful for thinking 
through the political nature of water resources in the context of the 2007 political 
elections as well as a way of triangulating data obtained from primary and 
secondary sources in the Philippines. 
Photographs depicting the water supply situation in Tagbilaran. 
 
Distribution has improved markedly since 
privatisation with rehabilitation of network and 
storage facilities such as this BWUI water tower. 
 
Household collection of rainwater supplements 
municipal supply and enables informal sale of 
water to neighbours. 
 
Consumption of bottled drinking water is an ever 
increasing phenomenon. 
 
Bulk water suppliers provide water to 
households not connected to supply. 
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The Urbanisation of Water and Neoliberalisation of Supply 
Universal municipal waterworks coverage for urban residents and a 24-hour supply 
of piped water has not yet been achieved across Southeast Asia (McIntosh 2003) 
and as urban populations increase, the ability to meet water demand will be further 
constrained. The importance of ensuring urban water supply is magnified in light of 
the Millennium Development Goals’ target of halving the number of people without 
access to safe drinking water by 2010 (UN 2005).  
Worldwide, the provision of municipal water has been both a private and a public 
undertaking. The public provision of water can be traced to the nineteenth century 
and a growing concern for public health following cholera and typhoid epidemics in 
cities in England, Europe and the United States. The monopolistic characteristics of 
urban water networks served as further justification for public sector provision 
(Rogers et al. 2002). The notion of public sector provision of water resonated with 
economic policies emphasising modernisation through state-led economic growth as 
a strategy for rebuilding industrialised nations after World War Two. This paradigm 
for economic growth and development was subsequently supplanted into post-
independent nations in developing regions through official development assistance 
emanating from bilateral and multilateral sources. In particular, the Bretton Woods 
institutions — the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank — exerted a 
powerful influence over developing economies.  
Despite the historical justification for public water utilities to ensure fair 
distribution and safeguard public health, the public sector has not achieved this. As 
an outcome of pricing and revenue collection failures, lack of investment into 
infrastructure, corruption and other government failures, public water systems in 
much of Asia are only capable of delivering unsafe water irregularly (Lee and Floris 
2003). Consequently public sector failure has led to calls for the private sector to 
participate in urban water supply. This stance reflects and is amplified by the 
dominance of neoliberal discourse in influencing government policies and modes of 
governing.  
In the midst of sweeping neoliberal reforms of the 1980s, a dichotomy which 
positioned the state and the market in opposition served to justify private sector 
involvement (Weiss 2000; Leadbeater 2004). Rolling back the state, which was 
constructed as inefficient, ineffective, unwieldy and bureaucratic was seen as a 
necessary pre-condition to economic (and social) development. Where the state was 
seen to play a part, it was primarily in an enabling role: for example, reforms 
promoting trade and economic liberalisation along with institutional reforms to bring 
about greater economic integration and to create opportunities for private sector 
participation. Consequently, a shift occurred for international donors and others 
within the development fraternity from a focus on government to governance as the 
key variable in achieving development; in particular, good governance (Weiss 2000). 
More recently neoliberalism has been subjected to greater interrogation which 
moves beyond the simple state-market dichotomy to consider the interaction and 
blurriness of these two entities. While neoliberal ideals dominate economic policy in 
  
 
 
4
both developed and developing countries, neoliberalism has been revealed as not 
being monolithic or universal. Instead, differing trajectories of development and 
political economic processes have given rise to ‘local neoliberalisms’ embedded 
within broader networks and structures of neoliberalism (Brett 2000; Peck and 
Tickell 2002). Consequently, rather than seeking the wholesale replacement of 
government, greater attention has been given to finding ways to make what remains 
of government operate better. Hence good governance has been variously 
constructed as comprising or promoting decentralisation, democratisation, increased 
transparency and accountability, eliminating corruption, improving law and order, 
legal reforms, amongst others, in order to reform governments and their 
administrations to make them work better (World Bank 1992; Weiss 2000; Van 
Klinken 2003).  
In the context of urban water provision, the 1992 Dublin Principles have been 
significant in influencing conceptions of good water governance. Most notably, 
Principle Four states the importance of considering water as an economic good by 
recognising the economic value of water in all its competing uses. Inefficient water 
use and environmental degradation were seen as a failure to recognise the 
economic value of water; viewing water as an economic good would, therefore, lead 
to more efficient, and more equitable, use of water while also encouraging 
conservation and protection of water resources (WMO 1992).  
This principle and the pervasiveness of neoliberal ideology means there has been 
much support given to the idea of increasing private sector participation particularly 
in light of projected investment needed, in the order of billions of dollars, to meet 
Millennium Development Goal commitments (Lee and Floris 2003; Winpenny 2003). 
As a case in point, the Camdessus Report highlights opportunities that private sector 
participation brings to establishing and enhancing municipal water services both in 
developing and industrialised countries (Winpenny 2003). Uncertainty exists, 
however, as to whether private sector participation can redress public sector failures 
and ensure equitable access to all particularly given the limited success so far of 
privatisation ventures to bring about promised positive improvements.  
Cochabamba, Manila and Buenos Aires represent three well known failures of 
private sector participation in water provision (Barlow and Clarke 2002; Budds and 
McGranahan 2003). Instead of improved network conditions and greater access for 
the poor, each of these cities witnessed increased tariffs, high numbers of 
disconnections because of delinquent accounts, and high (re)connection fees. The 
profit-seeking nature of capitalist firms engaging in the provision of water is seen as 
undesirable and contrary to public wellbeing. In particular, profit maximisation and 
increasing consumption in order to generate profits of private firms are seen as 
ultimately detrimental to the sustainability of water resources and to be 
disadvantageous for the poor.  
Schouten and Schwartz (2006) argue that a major obstacle to accessing funds 
and investing in the water sector is the failure to take into account the political 
nature of water. Given the multifaceted nature of water as a public good, a social 
good, a merit good, an economic good, and so on (Mehta 2000), it is conceivable 
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that multiple (conflicting) views on how to best manage water may also exist. 
Consequently, because improvements in the water sector figures on the political 
agenda of many governments, and because water is an entity over which multiple 
conceptions are contested, Schouten and Schwartz (2006) argue the importance of 
also acknowledging water as a political good. This means making politics explicit. 
Urban political ecology provides a means by which to expose the nature of socio-
political relations and discourses which act to influence the way in which water 
services operate and the urbanisation of water by focusing on the ways in which 
political forces mediate social and environmental change in urban areas. 
Swyngedouw (2004: 9) distinguishes cities as comprising ‘dense networks of 
interwoven socio-spatial processes that are simultaneously human, material, natural, 
discursive, cultural, and organic’. The interconnected metabolisms which support 
urban life, such as water, food, telecommunications, are shown to be both 
environmental and social processes (ibid.). As such, the environment of the city is 
both natural and socially produced. The urbanisation of nature can therefore be 
seen as a result of historical geographical processes in which new environments and 
new natures are produced as an outcome of urban and environmental processes, in 
which some social groups are negatively affected while others benefit. Swyngedouw 
also draws attention to the need for a just urban socio-environmental perspective by 
insisting on questioning the multiple power relations which exist to reinforce uneven 
development (ibid.). 
Kaika’s (2003) analysis of the water supply shortage in Athens illustrates how 
water can be politicised by those in the political sphere to generate consensus and 
support. Kaika shows how the expectation that domestic water supply will always be 
there has been naturalised, as has acquiescence to clientelist political relations 
involved in implementing infrastructure projects. By promising development that 
would continue to ensure supply in the face of crisis (drought), political leaders were 
able to exploit households’ anxieties to garner support for a proposal to construct 
expensive storage facilities to increase supply. 
In the case of Tagbilaran, the ‘privatisation debate’ surrounding the legitimacy 
and efficacy of BWUI as the major urban water provider has been employed by 
political leaders in order to serve their own political agendas and does not 
necessarily reflect the effectiveness of BWUI or the public’s perceptions regarding its 
performance. The operation of BWUI and TCWS and the politicisation of water in 
Tagbilaran are discussed in the following section. 
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Public and Private Water Utilities in Tagbilaran City 
Tagbilaran City is the provincial capital of Bohol, Central Visayas region, the 
Philippines (see Figure 1). The population in 2000 was 77 700 comprising 15 585 
households. The average annual population growth between 1990 and 2000 was 
3.26 per cent, which was largely attributable to in-migration from municipalities 
within the province seeking employment and educational opportunities (City of 
Tagbilaran 2001). Projections place the current population at approximately 90 000. 
As previously mentioned, there are two waterworks utilities operating in 
Tagbilaran: BWUI and TCWS. Both are governed by the rules and regulations of the 
National Water Resources Board (NWRB), which is the regulatory and coordinating 
body responsible for the management and regulation of water resources (JICA et al. 
1998). NWRB is also responsible for regulating municipal waterworks systems as 
well as regulating water rates to be charged by waterworks operators. 
Urban water for domestic use in Tagbilaran is sourced from groundwater. The 
city is located in a karst limestone environment in which groundwater flows via 
conduit and cave systems. Flow velocities are fairly rapid with short residence time. 
The rapid movement of water coupled with the high degree of subsurface 
heterogeneity of Tagbilaran geology means that storage capacity is low. Household 
water demand is forecast to increase while supplies are already threatened due to 
over-extraction. Potential for contamination is also high; saltwater intrusion has 
already affected water quality in parts of Tagbilaran leading to the closure of some 
of the water utilities pumping stations in the city, necessitating the construction of 
pumping facilities in a neighbouring municipality. This was done as part of a 
program of network rehabilitation between 1997 and 1998. 
In 1997, the Provincial Government secured a five-year PHP351 million loan to 
expand and rehabilitate the PWS network, including pipelines and pumping stations 
supplying water to Tagbilaran. Upgrading and rehabilitation were completed in 1998 
with the total cost approaching PHP80 million and enabled many city residents to 
have 24-hour water supply for the first time. This was reported as a significant 
achievement for the then Governor of Bohol, Rene Relampagos.  
 
1 Estimated exchange rate in current prices: US$1 equivalent to PHP48. Prior to the 1997 Financial 
Crisis, US$1 was equivalent to approximately PHP25. 
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    Figure 1: Location map of Bohol, the Philippines 
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In 2000, Governor Relampagos undertook to privatise the PWS citing an 
awareness of the need to anticipate future growth and demand, and the difficulty for 
the Provincial Government to continue to expand and invest in the network. In 
addition, it was felt that privatisation removed the bias for urban area allocation and 
utilisation of funds, enabling funds to be freed-up for disbursement elsewhere in the 
province since more than PHP10 million was diverted annually to fund operation and 
maintenance of the water services in Tagbilaran (Province of Bohol 2000). 
Furthermore, privatisation was seen as a means of overcoming some of the political 
problems encountered by local governments in running public enterprises. In 
particular, informants observed that it is often difficult for local government units to 
run public enterprises such as water utilities because of the propensity for resources 
to be politicised in the Philippines. Consequently, attempts to raise tariffs, address 
delinquent accounts and other politically unpopular decisions often have adverse 
political consequences for incumbent political leaders, as demonstrated by the quote 
below.  
[People are] used to it being the government, because if they fail to pay their bill they 
can approach the governor and say they will vote for him if he will let them get away 
with not paying. The people can exert political pressure. They [politicians] are vulnerable 
to political pressure from down below – the people are the source of them staying in 
power (interview, local government representative, July 2003). 
The privatisation of the water utility was actively contested by a small number of 
anti-privatisation campaigners within the city. The strongest and most sustained 
opposition came from a group of lawyers called the Tagbilaran Alliance of Concerned 
Taxpayers (TACT). Attorney Victor De la Serna, a former governor of Bohol, along 
with five other lawyers in Tagbilaran who comprise TACT, has been strongly 
opposed to the privatisation of PWS since the outset. Their opposition to private 
sector involvement stems from concerns over the private sector’s ability to meet the 
needs of the poor: 
I am against [privatisation] in poor countries. With the government, they are motivated 
by public service. Public pressure can be asserted through elections so can force 
accountability. I have no objection to private companies as long as they are well 
controlled and well regulated (interview, civil society representative, September 2004). 
TACT publicly vocalised their position against the privatisation process in 
December 1999, after articles were published in Tagbilaran’s local newspapers 
outlining the Provincial Government’s intentions to commence tendering for the 
water joint venture (Bohol Chronicle 1999a, 1999b). From December 1999 to 
January 2000, TACT produced position papers against the proposal which were 
distributed to households and published in local newspapers. Also during this period, 
TACT spearheaded a signature campaign and claimed to have obtained over 10 000 
signatures against the privatisation. TACT spearheaded a campaign encouraging 
individuals opposed to the privatisation of the water utility not to pay their bills as a 
sign of protest (Bohol Chronicle 2001). Advertisements to this effect were placed in 
the Bohol Chronicle and were countered by an advertising campaign from BWUI 
insisting that consumers continue to pay their bills or risk disconnection. As it 
transpired, this group of individuals were themselves delinquent consumers who, 
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according to a later article published in the Bohol Chronicle, owed thousands of 
pesos for outstanding accounts (Arigo 2001). Through these means, TACT 
expressed their concern that water rates would likely increase at the hands of a 
profit-motivated private company, thereby adversely affecting household consumers 
particularly the poor (De la Serna 2001).  
Opposition to the privatisation manifested in a series of lengthy court battles 
regarding the legitimacy of the joint venture agreement and the motives of key 
people involved in negotiating the agreement. Charges of graft and corruption were 
filed against several key people engaged in the privatisation process including 
Governor Relampagos and other provincial officials (Bohol Chronicle 2000; De la 
Serna 2001). The result of these actions was that the final signing of the contract 
and assumption of operations by BWUI were more than four months later than 
originally intended. The contract was signed in August 2000 but BWUI did not 
commence operations until late December 2000. The political fallout for Relampagos 
following these actions was that it cost him his political career and was a factor in 
his loss to Erico Aumentado in the 2001 election.  
Governor Aumentado (2001-present) has publicly expressed his opposition to the 
privatisation and operation of BWUI under the terms of the 2000 joint venture 
agreement on a number of occasions. Of greatest significance are his proposals to 
buy back the water utility, first raised in the lead up to the 2004 election and again 
in the lead up to the 2007 election (Bagaipo 2007a). Several articles appeared in the 
local newspapers leading up to the May 2004 election and the ‘privatisation issue’ 
once more became an election issue between Governor Aumentado and the 
opposition leader, (former governor) Relampagos. 
The proposal to buy back the water utility re-located the privatisation of the 
water utility in the political arena and positioned it once more as a focus for 
electioneering in the lead up to the May 2004 government elections. Governor 
Aumentado won the May 2004 election and retained his position as Governor of 
Bohol; however, Rene Relampagos won more votes in Tagbilaran, which participants 
of my research construed as indicating that the people of Tagbilaran had forgiven 
him for the privatisation of the water utility because of the substantial improvements 
in terms of water quality, reliability and services since BWUI commenced operations. 
Shortly after the election, Relampagos took out a full page advertisement thanking 
his supporters, which pointed to his belief that his victory in Tagbilaran was 
vindication of his controversial decision to privatise the PWS: 
I thank you, the people of Tagbilaran City for the convincing majority votes that you 
have given me in the last elections. It was a different Tagbilaran that saw me in the 
2001 elections. Because of your change of heart, I feel vindicated that you finally saw 
the soundness of governance my administration did for Tagbilaran. 
It was the joint venture that put me down in the 2001 elections, it is the same issue that 
got me up in this year’s poll. 
I would like to believe that it was your personal experience of the beneficial effects of 
the joint venture project that brought you the realization that what my political enemies 
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were saying against me were all lies. Let’s continue to be more analytical when it comes 
to issues that affect our lives (Bohol Chronicle, 23 May 2004). 
An important ally to Aumentado is Tagbilaran City Mayor Dan Lim (2004-present), 
who, as well as supporting Aumentado in his 2007 campaign to buyback the utility, 
earlier sought to implement a city order prohibiting BWUI from disconnecting 
delinquent consumers (Ligalig 2004). In September 2004 Mayor Lim issued an 
executive order2 to prevent BWUI from disconnecting their consumers on the 
grounds of failing to pay their bills without first securing approval from City Hall. 
Through the order Mayor Lim sought to create an ad hoc committee to review the 
amount owed by residents along with their economic status and other factors 
deemed relevant. It was proposed that the committee could consider each case and 
make recommendations on disconnections. The order invokes the 1987 Constitution 
of the Philippines, particularly notions of “distributive justice” and “social 
responsibility of property ownership”, as its premise upon which to take notice of 
complaints made by poor city residents with respect to notices of disconnection 
(Ligalig 2004). 
Mayor Lim asserted that the executive order sought to ensure justice for the 
residents of Tagbilaran from BWUI, who were construed as being anti-poor (ibid.). 
Notably, however, Mayor Lim did not propose a similar process to vet disconnections 
from the TCWS network despite similar policies regarding disconnections. Indeed, 
when I asked him about this, he was unaware that TCWS had a policy on 
disconnections. 
Payment of water bills by households in Tagbilaran has historically been low and 
delinquent consumers were recognised as a problem for the effective operation of 
both utilities. It was not uncommon to have clients that were many months, if not 
years, in arrears despite reminder notices being sent out. By late 1998, the Bohol 
Chronicle reported that the PWS had unpaid water accounts totalling PHP6 million 
(Bohol Chronicle 1998). 
The impetus for improving collection efficiency came in 1998 when the Provincial 
Government implemented a policy of disconnection of service for water consumers 
who failed to pay their bills on time (ibid.). Collection rates were initially low; 
however, there has been a substantial improvement in collection efficiency following 
privatisation and the assumption of services by BWUI because of a water 
delinquency campaign and the effective enforcement of the policy concerning 
disconnections. TCWS embarked on a similar campaign to improve bill collection in 
2001. The move to become stricter has seen a marked improvement in compliance 
2 The executive order issued by the City of Tagbilaran, 2004 is entitled “Executive Order Regulating 
the Exercise of the Prerogative of Public Utilities Operating in the City to Refuse or Suspend Service 
Due to Failure or Inability to City Residents to Pay their Bills, in Order to Give Substance and 
Meaning to the Doctrine of Distributive Justice and to Afford the Poorest Sectors of Tagbilaran the 
Privilege of Sanctuary and Temporary Refuge.”  
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from consumers of both waterworks systems. Both BWUI and TCWS have a policy of 
disconnection if consumers fail to pay their accounts within 90 days, and both BWUI 
and TCWS charge consumers a reconnection fee.  
Despite both water utilities having relatively similar policies, there is a striking 
difference in perception between households served by BWUI and TCWS regarding 
bill payment, strictness and disconnections. BWUI consumers tended to think BWUI 
was very strict and conflated strictness concerning bill payment with a rate increase 
by frequently claiming, incorrectly, that the price of water had increased since BWUI 
had commenced operations. On the other hand, TCWS households noted their 
obligation to pay their bills in a timely fashion, but did not consider this as an 
indication that TCWS had become stricter in recent years. Consumers of both utilities 
demonstrated confusion about when the utilities move to disconnect delinquent 
households, with many stating disconnection occurs after only one month.  
The passage of the executive order in September 2004 to prevent disconnections 
obviously has merit, particularly since it was concerned with ensuring equity and 
fairness for poor households; however, specifically targeting BWUI and contributing 
to the broadcast of misinformation arguably detracts from the benevolence of the 
order and instead casts it as being simply anti-BWUI. Although the executive order 
was passed in late September 2004, shortly before I left the Philippines, it was never 
implemented and no official reason has yet been reported (email communication, 
Ligalig, 2 August 2005). This does not mean that the controversy and politicisation 
of water in Tagbilaran has subsided, as the next section will show. 
Politics of Water Pricing and the Buy Back Proposal Part Two 
In May 2005 BWUI submitted an application to the National Water Resources Board 
for a water rate increase. Based on information reported in the Bohol Chronicle, 
there was considerable public and political discontent over BWUI’s application for a 
rate increase, particularly since there was the widely held belief that BWUI was 
subject to a five-year moratorium on price increases and the application fell within 
five years. However, according to the joint venture agreement contract BWUI was 
free to apply for a rate increase after only two years. Nevertheless, the supposed 
breach of the contract conditions was reported on numerous occasions in the local 
newspapers and formed the basis of public protest by groups such as TACT.  
Much of the controversy centres on how much water rates will rise, with 
substantial coverage given by the local newspapers on the matter. The tariff 
structure for BWUI is an increasing block tariff, with the minimum rate for BWUI set 
at PHP65.00 for consumption between 0–10 m3 and increasing commensurate with 
quantity. Under the proposed new rates, the minimum is set at PHP80, with 
increases applying to each block. Table 1 provides a comparison of the pricing 
structure, current and proposed, for BWUI.  
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Table 1: Bohol Water Utilities Inc. tariffs. 
Consumption Block  
(m3) 
Price  
(PHP per m3) 
Proposed new price  
(PHP per m3) 
0-10 65.00 (min rate) 80.00 (min rate) 
11-20 7.60 10.75 
21-30 8.78 13.75 
31+ 17.87 30.50 
The figures demonstrate that there will be a substantial price increase for those 
households consuming more than 30 m3. This represents an increase of over 70 per 
cent of the original rate and was seized upon by anti-BWUI factions as indicating 
BWUI’s profit-driven nature and anti-poor intentions. While poor households will be 
affected by price increases — between 17 per cent and 25 per cent for all other 
price blocks — findings from field surveys placed the average household 
consumption per month at 26 m3 (Fisher 2006), which conforms to results of 
surveys conducted in Metro Cebu in which the average household consumption was 
estimated as being 27 m3 (Largo et al. 1998). In both cases, there was also 
evidence to suggest that average water consumption increased with income levels, 
with poorer households consuming less than 30 m3. This suggests, therefore, that 
claiming BWUI is anti-poor by focusing on the rate increase for consumption above 
30 m3 is misleading since the poor presently consume less than this amount. What’s 
more, public anxieties concerning price increases have been fuelled by 
misinformation to such an extent that many households feel prices have already 
increased. 
Hearings concerning the water rate increase were held in Manila between July 
and October 2005. The fact the hearings were held in Manila was reported as being 
displeasing for many city and provincial government officers. The suggestion was 
made by one city councillor that the public hearings should be held in Tagbilaran 
rather than Manila in order to enable public participation. In response to this, 
however, a representative from the NWRB was reported as saying that they were 
unable to hold hearings outside of Manila because of budgetary constraints.  
This comment reiterates studies which have identified systemic and internal 
problems with the NWRB including a small number of staff, limited financial 
resources, and it is centrally located in Manila leading to a non-existent regional 
presence. The NWRB has been criticised as having a weak institutional environment 
and for poor dissemination of information about procedures and requirements 
concerning water rights, permits, the role of NWRB and so forth. For instance, I 
would suggest that there is a fairly low level of awareness that NWRB is responsible 
for approving the water tariffs that waterworks utilities may charge. Instead, it 
would be more commonly believed that these rates are set by local government 
units themselves. In addition, although conducting hearings in Manila is not ideal 
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and can be construed as being disadvantageous for local residents in Tagbilaran, 
NWRB does not yet have in place a policy for holding hearings in regional offices to 
extend its reach into the provinces, nor the capacity to do so. For these and other 
reasons, the NWRB is generally regarded as having been unable to fulfil its entire 
mandate and as having concentrated its efforts mainly on the approval of water 
rights primarily around Manila (Navarro 2003; Sy 2003; World Bank 2003).  
Shortly after BWUI lodged its application to increase water rates with NWRB, a 
proposal for the Provincial Government to buy back the utility was put forward again 
by Governor Aumentado. In addition, both the Provincial and City Governments 
formally lodged their opposition to BWUI’s application for a water rate increase. At 
the same time, BWUI was involved in a case being tried through the Regional Trial 
Court regarding a Provincial Government ordinance in 1996, pre-divestiture, that had 
increased water rates and which was found to be illegal. The claim was that the 
water rate should be rolled back to 1997 rates and consumers should receive a 
refund for the water consumed since then (between 1997 and 2002) (Sanchez 
2004). This case was originally brought forward by Dan Lim before he became the 
mayor of Tagbilaran.  
The courts originally found that BWUI should refund consumers; however, after a 
series of appeals and counter-appeals the matter was finally resolved in January 
2006 (Ligalig 2006). BWUI was absolved of the responsibility for refunding 
consumers because the dispute was over the legitimacy of the Provincial Ordinance 
in setting the water rates charged by PWS whereas BWUI’s rates were determined 
and approved by NWRB as part of the joint venture agreement process. This long 
court process occupied considerable attention in the newspapers and deflected 
attention away from BWUI’s application for a short time at least.  
The NWRB eventually approved BWUI’s application for an increase of its water 
rates in September 2006, to be implemented in November that year. However, 
before BWUI could implement the new water rates, the City and Provincial 
Governments both filed cases to the courts seeking injunctions and questioning the 
legitimacy of the increase (Bagaipo 2007b). As of April 2007 these cases were still 
pending; therefore, the new rates had not been implemented. 
Since September 2006, there have been more calls from De la Serna, Aumentado 
and Lim, among others, to buy back the water utility, dividing the asset between the 
city and provincial governments. The bases for their proposal are that the 
government should be responsible for providing public services such as water; to 
ensure public welfare and well-being since BWUI is a profit-motivated private 
company and thereby protect the public good qualities of water; and that, in time, 
the water utility will be able to generate funds for other public services such as 
healthcare. 
In December 2006, Salcon responded by requesting the Provincial Government to 
provide a plan outlining how they would buy back its 70 per cent equity. A former 
Capitol official was reported in the Bohol Chronicle as saying that Salcon was 
considering selling its shares because of the seemingly hostile treatment of 
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provincial government officials every time local elections were about to be held, with 
a revival of the buy-back issue (Bagaipo 2007c). 
In February 2007, Mayor Lim organised a public rally which was attended by 
approximately 500 people to protest the presence of BWUI and made a speech 
reasserting his claim that the city and provincial governments are adamant about 
reacquiring the water utility. In his speech he was also reported as having 
threatened that if Salcon refused to leave within the year, he would find legal 
remedies to shut down the utility (Bagaipo 2007b). 
While Tagbilaran-based informants and articles in the Bohol Chronicle provide 
insight into the public dimension of the BWUI situation, ascertaining the perceptions 
of local residents is difficult to accomplish from Canberra. However, on 1 April 2007, 
the Bohol Chronicle published findings from a survey conducted in Tagbilaran by the 
University of Bohol Research Center in March 2007 which indicated that 39 per cent 
of respondents favoured the idea of the Provincial Government buying back the 
water utility while 36 per cent were undecided (Bohol Chronicle 2007). In the same 
survey, 41 per cent of respondents indicated they were satisfied with present 
services.  
In 2004, I surveyed households in Tagbilaran shortly after the election and asked 
respondents to comment on whether they felt the Provincial Government should buy 
back the water utility — bearing in mind that this was relatively fresh in people’s 
minds since Aumentado had first proposed this idea just before the election. The 
findings of my survey were that 41 per cent felt the government should buy back 
the utility and 34 per cent were undecided. Further inquiries into why people held 
these positions provided interesting insights (Table 2 compares findings from the 
two studies). 
Table 2: Public opinion over the buy back proposal, 2004 and 2007. 
Survey In Favour Opposed Undecided 
University of Bohol 2007 39 25 36 
Fisher 2004 41 25 34 
Source: Bohol Chronicle (2007) and Fisher (2006). 
Improvements and changes in the operation of BWUI influenced opinions 
concerning the government’s proposal to buy back the utility: those who felt water 
services and quality were better before were more inclined to think the government 
should buy the water utility back, while those who felt water services and quality 
had improved under BWUI disagreed with the proposal. Many respondents felt the 
government should be responsible for providing basic services such as water 
because of the public good aspect of urban water service. More than half of those 
who felt the government should buy back the water utility felt this would be for the 
common good of the people, which echoes the statements made by De la Serna and 
others. It was generally felt that the government would be more accountable to 
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residents and there would be greater opportunity for public involvement in decision-
making if the water company was publicly owned. There were also fears concerning 
the lack of accountability to the public by BWUI because they were seen as being a 
profit-motivate company. In reality, however, the Provincial Government had 
struggled to cover the cost of operation and maintenance and to collect water rates 
from households when they had owned the water utility.  
For others, it was felt that if the government were to buy back the water utility, 
they wouldn’t necessarily have to pay their water bills anymore or they could pay 
them late. Although only a relatively small proportion of respondents made 
statements such as these — approximately 10 per cent — such responses recall pre-
privatisation behaviour when the majority of consumers either paid their bills late or 
not at all. Such comments, I would argue, point to the risk of free-riding by some 
individuals based on previous consumer behaviour and also because it is difficult for 
governments to implement unpopular policies since they may be voted out in the 
next election. Although people were unhappy about BWUI’s strictness, there was a 
sense that such strictness was tolerable because of improved services, quality, and 
operation, and also because the policy was implemented across the board whereas 
the government was seen as being prone to favouritism and corruption.  
Recent comments from Tagbilaran-based informants about the buy back issue 
suggest that much of the controversy is being fuelled by politicians and the media as 
an ‘election issue’ while residents are largely unconcerned by it. However, an 
important difference between the 2007 proposal and the 2004 one is that the 
looming threat of water rate increases may make it easier for people to be mobilised 
against BWUI than was the case in 2004. Whether the new water rates will be 
implemented remains uncertain. Similarly, whether the provincial and city 
governments are able to present an offer to Salcon that it finds acceptable, and then 
find the funding to buy back the utility is also uncertain. 
Conclusions 
Privatisation in Tagbilaran amplified the politics of water resources and urban supply 
and highlighted the contestability of water through debates over its properties as a 
public good or a (private) commodity. The privatisation of the waterworks became 
an election issue during the 2001 election in which the politicisation of the 
privatisation process was largely demarcated along party lines. This positioned 
Relampagos and his supporters as being for the privatisation of PWS and his political 
opponent, Aumentado, against the privatisation. Within this climate details 
concerning the privatisation of the water utility became lost in rhetoric which served 
to obfuscate the complexities associated with urban water provision by instead 
deflecting attention towards the pro versus anti-privatisation debate. BWUI was 
portrayed as profit-seeking and indifferent to the city’s poor by insisting upon 
regular payment of water bills and implementing a strict policy concerning 
disconnection, while the Relampagos administration was demonised for failing to live 
up to its part of the social contract to ensure citizen wellbeing by selling a public 
good.  
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The ‘privatisation issue’ emerged in the lead up to the 2004 election, and again in 
the lead up to the 2007 election. In the politicisation of Tagbilaran’s urban water 
supply those opposed to private sector participation constructed residents of 
Tagbilaran as helpless and passive in the face of privatisation and as needing to be 
safeguarded by the government to ensure their well-being; hence, the proposal to 
buy back the utility. The media has also played a role in politicising water supply in 
the way that it has been a conduit for wrong information and erroneous claims to be 
brought into the public arena.  
The politicisation of water and BWUI intensified in the early months of 2007 but, 
perhaps surprisingly, died down in the weeks leading up to and immediately after 
the election. The results of the May 2007 elections saw Lim retain his office as 
Mayor of Tagbilaran and Aumentado retain his office as Governor of Bohol. For the 
moment at least plans to buy back the water utility appear to have been shelved 
although it is likely that the eventual, and inevitable, implementation of the new 
water tariffs will precipitate yet another proposal to buy back the water utility. Based 
on the previous efforts of Lim, Aumentado and De la Serna, it seems unlikely they 
will give up their efforts against BWUI. If the provincial government, either in 
partnership with the city government or separately, does find the means to buy back 
the water utility, it will need to perform markedly better than it did in the past to 
ensure the sustainable and equitable provision of water into the future, and be 
prepared to adopt strategies to overcome the potential for free-riding.  
As well as being a study in private sector participation, and perhaps more 
importantly, the case in Tagbilaran highlights the institutional deficiencies in 
Philippines and the inadequacy of the regulatory system governing water. In this 
regard, it is less important to fixate on private versus public provision since both are 
capable of providing poor services which are unequitable and unsustainable in the 
absence of adequate regulation and institutions. In this paper I have focused only 
on urban water supply: the deficiencies of the Philippine water policy environment 
are even more apparent when one considers matters of water resource 
management.  
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